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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I defend Moorean Dogmatism against a novel objection 
raised by Adam Leite. Leite locates the defectiveness of the Moorean reasoning 
explicitly not in the failure of the Moorean argument to transmit warrant from its 
premises to its conclusion but rather in the failure of an epistemic agent to satisfy 
certain epistemic responsibilities that arise in the course of conscious and deliberate 
reasoning. I will first show that there exist cases of Moorean reasoning that are not put 
into jeopardy by the considerations that Leite presents. Second, I will argue that certain 
commitments of Leite’s concerning the notion of warrant are in tension with his verdict 
that the Moorean reasoning is defective.  
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Introduction  
Dogmatists such as Pryor maintain that perceptual experiences warrant us 
immediately in believing propositions about the external world.1 Pryor takes this 
to mean that it is not a precondition that, in order for an epistemic agent to be 
warranted perceptually in believing a proposition p, the agent is in need of 
antecedent and independent warrant to believe something else. In particular, 
Pryor has in mind that an agent is not in need of antecedent warrant to believe 
the denials of skeptical possibilities or hypotheses that are incompatible with the 
truth of p, such as the hypothesis that the agent is a brain-in-a-vat deceived by an 
evil scientist. The view that perceptual experiences warrant us in believing 
propositions about the external world without the need of any antecedently 
warranted attitudes concerning the non-obtaining of certain skeptical possibilities 
has been called by Pryor ‘liberalism.’2 The opposing view, entitled ‘conservatism,’ 
                                                                
1 See James Pryor, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist,” Noûs 34 (2000): 517–49; James Pryor, 
“What’s Wrong With Moore’s Argument?” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 349–78; and James 
Pryor, “There is Immediate Justification,” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, eds. 
Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 181–202. 
2 See James Pryor, “When Warrant Transmits,” in Wittgenstein, Epistemology and Mind: 
Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, ed. Annalisa Coliva (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 269–303; and James Pryor “What’s Wrong With Moore’s Argument?” 
Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 349–78. 
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most notably associated with the writings of Crispin Wright, maintains that an 
epistemic agent is in need of such antecedent warrant in order to be justified via a 
perceptual state.3 The dogmatist or liberalist view seems to entail that a certain 
type of argument is suitable for gaining warrant to believe anti-skeptical 
conclusions. Very roughly, if an agent has (1) the perceptual experience that there 
is a hand in front of her and she is not in a mental state that defeats the warrant 
resulting from this experiential state, then the agent is prima facie warranted in 
believing (2) that there is a hand. However, the proposition that the epistemic 
agent has a hand entails that she is not a brain-in-a-vat deceived by an evil 
scientist. If one further assumes that warrant is closed under known entailment, 
the epistemic agent thereby seems to have warrant to believe (3) that she is not a 
brain-in-a-vat as well. But, according to Pryor, the Moorean argument only entails 
that an agent has propositional warrant to believe its conclusion. In order to be 
doxastically warranted in believing the conclusion of the Moorean argument (3), 
further conditions need to be satisfied. For instance, when an agent doubts that (3) 
obtains, given other beliefs (warranted or not) she might happen to have, then 
engaging in the deduction might not be a way for her to gain a doxastically 
warranted belief in the conclusion of the Moorean argument. In this case, the 
doubts that the agent happens to have rationally obstruct her in adopting a belief 
in (2) and thereby in the conclusion (3) of the Moorean argument.4 
A lot of ink has been spilled on whether the Moorean argument itself and 
the reasoning that this argument seems to license are really epistemically 
satisfactory.5 Adam Leite has suggested in a recent paper that the reasoning the 
                                                                
3 There is space in between these positions. See Annalisa Coliva, “Moore’s Proof, Liberals and 
Conservatives. Is There a Third Wittgensteinian way?” in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: 
Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, 323–351 for a ‘Wittgensteinian’ alternative. 
4 Moreover, Pryor and others have pointed out that the Moorean argument should not be 
confused with other, more ambitious things it might be thought to accomplish. For instance, 
Pryor maintains in “What’s Wrong” that the reasoning from (1) and (2) to (3) should not be 
understood as being suitable for convincing someone who doubts its conclusion. Martin Davies 
has argued that the Moorean argument should not be conceived of as being able to settle the 
question of whether (3) is indeed the case. See Martin Davies, “Two Purposes of Arguing and 
two Epistemic Projects,” in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of 
Frank Jackson, ed. Ian Ravenscroft (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 337–383. 
5 Crispin Wright famously maintains that the Moorean argument suffers from transmission 
failure. See, for example, Crispin Wright, “Facts and Certainty,” Proceedings of the British 
Academy 71 (1985): 429–72; Crispin Wright, “(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore 
and John McDowell,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 330–348; Crispin 
Wright, “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free?),” Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
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Moorean argument licenses is epistemically unsatisfactory in a novel kind of way.6 
Leite locates the defectiveness of the Moorean reasoning explicitly not in the 
failure of the Moorean argument to transmit warrant from its premises to its 
conclusion, as others have done before, but rather in the failure of an epistemic 
agent to satisfy certain epistemic responsibilities that arise in the course of 
conscious and deliberate reasoning.7 According to Leite’s diagnosis, if an epistemic 
agent consciously and deliberately reasons from (1) to (2) and from (2) to (3), this 
reasoning isn’t a way for her to gain a doxastically warranted belief in (2) and (3). 
Leite maintains that the agent doesn’t arrive at a doxastically warranted belief in 
(2) and (3) because the agent lacks properly warranted beliefs concerning the non-
obtaining of certain disenabling conditions in order for (1) to confer warrant on 
(2). In particular, in order to arrive in an epistemically satisfactory way at the 
conclusion of the Moorean argument via a process of conscious reasoning, the 
agent needs to have a warranted belief that (3) does indeed obtain, because the 
falsity of (3) would rob (1) of its force to warrant (2). But since the agent does not 
have a warranted belief in (3), Leite concludes that the agent behaves 
epistemically irresponsibly in performing this deduction.  
In this paper, I will assess Leite’s diagnosis of the alleged shortcoming of the 
reasoning that seems to be licensed by the Moorean argument. The upshot of my 
discussion will be that there exist cases of Moorean-style reasoning that are apt for 
providing an agent with doxastically warranted beliefs in the conclusion of the 
Moorean argument and that are not put into jeopardy by the considerations that 
Leite presents. Thus, I will conclude that Leite hasn’t made the case that the 
Moorean reasoning is defective in a sense that threatens the dogmatist. Moreover, 
I will show that Leite’s verdict that the epistemic agent behaves epistemically 
irresponsibly if she were to reason from (1) to (3) is in tension with what Leite 
says about the properties of warranting states.  
                                                                                                                                       
Volume 78 (2004): 167–212; and Crispin Wright, “The Perils of Dogmatism,” in Themes from G. 
E. Moore, eds. Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 25–47. 
6 See Adam Leite, “Immediate Warrant, Epistemic Responsibility, and Moorean Dogmatism,” in 
Reasons for Belief, eds. Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 158–179. 
7 See for an overview of the literature on transmission failure Luca Moretti and Tommaso 
Piazza, “Transmission of Justification and Warrant,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2013), ed. Edward Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/win2013/entries/ 
transmission-justification-warrant and Chris Tucker, “Transmission and Transmission Failure in 
Epistemology,” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://iep.utm.edu/transmis/, July 30, 
2015.  
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My paper is organized as follows. In the first section, I will briefly outline 
Leite’s main commitments concerning the notion of warrant and the conditions 
that an agent needs to satisfy in order to behave in an epistemically responsible 
way if she engages in conscious and deliberate reasoning. In the second section, I 
will recapitulate why Leite maintains that an agent is to be epistemically blamed if 
she reasons according to the Moorean argument. In the third section, I will 
present two cases that call into question Leite’s verdict that epistemic agents are to 
be blamed if they reason according to the Moorean argument. Finally, in the 
fourth section, I will pursue my second line of criticism. As already indicated 
above, I will make the case that Leite’s verdict regarding the Moorean reasoning is 
inconsistent with what he says about the nature of warranting states.  
1. Leite on Warrant and Epistemic Responsibility  
Leite assumes that warrants are states that count in favor of believing a given 
proposition. If warrants are supposed to play this role, they must satisfy certain 
further conditions. In his paper, Leite introduces the following five characteristics 
of warranting states.8 First, Leite maintains that warrants are states or conditions 
that an agent can become aware of. Second, though this first commitment seems 
to imply that Leite is committed to a certain form of internalism concerning 
warrants, he nonetheless maintains that warranting states or conditions are not 
confined to the psychological states of an epistemic agent or that they should be 
accessible through introspection alone. Leite claims that mind-independent facts 
or certain worldly conditions may play the role of warrants as well. Third, 
warrants are, according to Leite, normative epistemic reasons. This is supposed to 
mean that, if an agent is warranted in believing p, the appropriate doxastic 
response for the agent, given his warrant, is to believe p. Fourth, Leite is of the 
view that warrants can play the role of normative epistemic reasons since they 
make it likely that the contents they speak in favor of do indeed obtain. In 
contrast to Pryor and other participants in the debate concerning Moore’s 
argument, Leite explicitly acknowledges that our ordinary practice suggests that 
warrants must indeed be conceived of as being reliable. He backs this claim up in 
the following way:  
Suppose that someone is brought up to predict the outcomes of battles by reading 
tea leaves, a method endorsed by everyone in his community. Neither he nor 
anyone in his community is in a position to understand the considerations 
showing that there is no reliable connection between the arrangement of leaves 
in tea cups and the outcomes of battles. This person performs blamelessly if he 
                                                                
8 See Leite, “Immediate Warrant,” 161–163. 
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infers from considerations about tea leaves that a battle will turn out a certain 
way; he has done everything that can reasonably be demanded of him in order to 
form a true belief. But at the same time, we feel that there is a shortcoming here. 
We might say, ‘His training and circumstances are unfortunate. He really 
shouldn’t believe on that basis that the battle will turn out a certain way; no one 
should. Regardless of what he thinks, considerations about tea leaves don’t 
actually provide any reason to believe anything at all about the outcomes of 
battles.’ When we make judgments like this, what seems to be motivating us is 
the thought that there is not in fact the right sort of connection between 
arrangements of tea leaves and the outcomes of battles: the one is not a reliable 
indicator of the other, and as a result the belief about the outcome of battle is not 
warranted.9 
However, to come to Leite’s fifth major commitment concerning the notion 
of warrant, he acknowledges that warrants may fail to exert their power to 
warrant particular propositions or beliefs. In case certain “disenabling conditions” 
obtain, as Leite calls them, believing a particular proposition p is not normatively 
the right thing to do, given the putative warrant in question. Leite provides the 
following example to illustrate this point. If human physiology were such as that 
taking ibuprofen would not alleviate pain, then an epistemic agent that 
remembered that she just recently took an ibuprofen to be relieved of her 
headache would not be warranted in believing that her pain is going to lessen. 
Because if human physiology really were such that taking ibuprofen wouldn’t 
relieve pain, remembering taking ibuprofen wouldn’t be a reliable indicator for 
the truth of the proposition that an agent’s pain is going to be relieved. Leite takes 
a disenabling condition to be an objective state in the world that calls into 
question that a given warranting state is a reliable indicator of the truth of its 
content. If a disenabling condition obtains, then it is not appropriate for an 
epistemic agent in the normative sense to adopt a doxastic attitude toward the 
content that is warranted by the warranting state. Leite stresses, however, that 
disenabling conditions should not be confused with defeaters. A defeater is, as 
Leite explains, a condition or state such that it defeats “the prima facie or 
defeasible warrant provided by a particular warranting state or condition.”10 In 
contrast to a disenabling condition, a defeater does not call into question that a 
given warranting state is a reliable indicator of the truth of a particular content 
per se. A disenabling condition, however, would prevent a warranting state or 
condition from providing prima facie warrant in principle.  
                                                                
9 Leite, “Immediate Warrant,” 162. 
10 Leite, “Immediate Warrant,” 163. 
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Besides these five commitments concerning the nature of warrant, Leite 
outlines a proposal with respect to the conditions that an agent needs to satisfy in 
order to obtain doxastically warranted beliefs via processes of conscious and 
deliberate reasoning. He proposes two conditions that an epistemic agent needs to 
satisfy in order to obtain doxastically warranted beliefs via processes of conscious 
reasoning. First, Leite maintains that doxastic justification is an epistemic status 
that should be conceived of as intimately related to epistemically responsible 
behavior, and that in order to behave epistemically responsibly, an agent must 
satisfy certain further conditions than just being in possession of a warranting 
state. Most writers assume that an epistemic agent needs to satisfy some basing 
requirement if she is to obtain a doxastically warranted belief. However, Leite 
urges, that, in addition to the basing requirement, the agent needs to have beliefs 
that a particular warranting state W indeed speaks in favor of the content that is 
warranted by W. Leite introduces the following principle with respect to the 
conditions that an epistemic agent needs to satisfy in order to obtain a doxastically 
warranted belief via processes of conscious reasoning:  
When in the course of explicit, conscious deliberation or reasoning one bases a 
belief that p upon a particular warranting state or condition W, that belief will 
not be formed or held responsibly unless one takes W to support (defeasibly tell 
in favor of) the truth of p.11 
But Leite remarks that the beliefs that the agent needs to possess concerning 
the support relation between the warranting state or condition and the respective 
propositional content only need to be dispositional or implicit. If the beliefs in 
question were supposed to be occurrent, it would be obvious, as Leite himself 
acknowledges, that he would be imposing conditions too strong to be satisfied by 
ordinary epistemic agents.  
Second, Leite introduces another principle that is closely associated with 
the principle just mentioned. It concerns how an epistemic agent needs to be 
situated vis-à-vis the aforementioned disenabling conditions in order to obtain a 
doxastically warranted belief thorough processes of conscious reasoning. Let  
stand for such a disenabling condition for warrant W. Leite says:  
Suppose that you base your belief that p upon W. As I’ve just argued, this 
requires you to believe that W tells (at least defeasibly) in favor of the truth of p. 
And suppose that you recognize that ’s obtaining would prevent W from even 
defeasibly telling in favor of the truth of p. Then, you are rationally required to 
believe also that  does not obtain, at least if you consider the question. For 
given that you recognize the incompatibility between ’s obtaining and W’s 
                                                                
11 Leite, “Immediate Warrant,” 165. 
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defeasibly telling in favor of the truth of p, requirements of consistency preclude 
you from endorsing both the claim that  obtains and that W tells in favor of the 
truth of p, and they also preclude you from endorsing the claim that W tells in 
favor of the truth of p while suspending judgment or forming no opinion at all 
about whether  obtains. So if you consider the question at all, you are rationally 
committed to endorsing the claim that  does not obtain.12    
According to Leite, if the epistemic agent does not believe that  does not 
obtain in case he takes W to speak in favor of believing a particular proposition p 
and considers the question as to whether  obtains, then the agent behaves in an 
epistemically inappropriate way. But, in addition, as Leite urges, an epistemic 
agent needs to possess a doxastically warranted belief to the effect that  does not 
obtain. This further requirement is supposed to result from what it means to 
believe something responsibly. Thus, the principle of Leite’s that specifies the 
constitutive conditions that an agent needs to fulfill in order to obtain warranted 
beliefs through processes of conscious and deliberate reasoning can be stated as 
follows:  
(DR) In order for S to behave in an epistemically appropriate way when S bases 
her belief in p upon a particular warranting state W in the course of conscious 
reasoning, for every disenabling condition  that S explicitly considers (and 
recognizes to be a disenabling condition), (i) S needs to believe that does not 
obtain, and (ii) this latter belief needs to be doxastically warranted as well. 
Leite qualifies this principle. First, according to him, this requirement only 
applies to cases in which an agent forms a belief p through processes of conscious 
reasoning. Fulfillment of the conditions laid down in (DR) is not supposed to be a 
necessary precondition for an epistemic agent to be warranted immediately or 
non-inferentially via a perceptual state. Leite follows Pryor by claiming that an 
epistemic agent can be warranted immediately in believing a particular 
proposition without having any beliefs whatsoever concerning the non-obtaining 
of certain disenabling conditions. Second, this principle is limited to those 
possibilities that the agent explicitly considers. Though Leite is not explicit about 
it, I take it that explicitly considering a skeptical possibility amounts to adopting 
an occurrent attitude toward this possibility(like believing or treating as an 
open question) and acknowledging that would disenable a particular warranting 
state W to confer warrant on a given belief p. It seems plausible that possibilities 
toward which the agent does not have any occurrent attitudes, and very likely also 
those in whose obtaining the agent places low confidence, are not supposed to be 
possibilities with respect to which an agent needs to have any warranted attitudes 
                                                                
12 Leite, “Immediate Warrant,” 167. 
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in order to behave epistemically responsibly. Third, this requirement only 
concerns disenabling conditions and not defeaters. It is important to bear these 
qualifications in mind, because I will argue next that the second of these 
qualifications creates a problem for Leite’s verdict as to why the Moorean 
reasoning goes wrong.   
2. What’s Wrong with the Moorean Reasoning According to Leite 
How does Leite’s position thus far about warrant and epistemically appropriate 
behavior bear on the reasoning that seems to be licensed by the Moorean 
argument? Leite himself acknowledges that dogmatists such as Pryor don’t 
conceive of the Moorean argument as providing doxastic warrant or justification 
to believe its conclusion just in virtue of the relation between its propositions (1) 
through (3). However, Leite claims that if the Moorean argument were to be 
employed by an epistemic agent to obtain guidance in what to believe about the 
possibility of whether or not she happens to be a brain-in-a-vat being fed with 
experiences by an evil scientist, she would behave in an epistemically 
irresponsible way. Leite maintains that our verdict as to why the agent behaves 
epistemically irresponsibly stems from the fact that the agent fails to satisfy the 
conditions as laid down in principle (DR). He says: 
For consider how the responsibilist view sketched above would regard this 
reasoning. That view allowed that a visual experience as of your hands provides 
immediate warrant for the belief that you have hands. However, being a 
disembodied spirit deceived by an evil demon would be a disenabling condition 
for that warrant. Suppose, then, that you recognize that this is so (though 
perhaps not in so many words). You are in the position specified by the 
dogmatist’s thesis. You are deliberating about whether to believe, on the basis of 
your visual experience, that you have hands. Suppose that you go ahead and form 
this belief on this basis. According to the responsibilist view, the belief will not 
be responsibly held, since you do not yet believe that you are not a disembodied 
spirit under an evil demon’s sway. (That latter belief is supposed to be arrived at 
only in the next stage in the reasoning.) Since the belief that you have hands 
would not be responsibly held under such circumstances, it also wouldn’t be 
doxastically justified. And if you go on to infer from it that you are not a 
disembodied spirit under an evil demon’s sway, that latter belief will not be 
doxastically justified either.13 
As Leite sets it up, when an epistemic agent starts to reason in accordance 
with the Moorean argument, the agent explicitly considers at the beginning of this 
reasoning the possibility that she might be a brain-in-a-vat deceived by an evil 
                                                                
13 Leite, “Immediate Warrant,” 171. 
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scientist. Leite seems to assume that the agent does not merely entertain or just 
contemplate this possibility but indeed places some confidence in it or treats it as 
an open question. Moreover, the agent realizes that if this brain-in-a-vat 
possibility were to obtain, her visual experiences would not count in favor of 
believing propositions about the external world since the skeptical hypothesis is a 
disenabling condition in order for (1) to confer warrant on (2). However, since the 
epistemic agent has no belief that this possibility does not obtain (and thereby 
trivially no doxastically warranted belief that it does not obtain), the agent fails to 
satisfy the clauses (i) and (ii) of the principle (DR). Thus, the agent behaves 
epistemically irresponsibly if she were to believe (2) on the basis of (1) and go on 
to infer the conclusion (3) of the Moorean argument.  
3. Two Ways in Which an Agent Might Acquire a Doxastically Justified Belief 
Through Moorean-Style Reasoning 
In the introduction to this paper, I briefly described what Pryor thinks regarding 
when an agent might end up with a doxastically warranted belief in the 
conclusion of the Moorean argument. Pryor says concerning Stewart Cohen’s red 
wall argument – a different, though structurally identical, argument to Moore’s:  
A subject can have some justification to believe P, but be unable to rationally 
believe P on the basis of that justification, because of some (unjustified) beliefs 
and doubts he also has. Consider again your belief that your color vision is 
defective. Suppose that this belief is unjustified (but you don’t realize it). Because 
you don’t have justification to doubt your color vision, I don’t think the 
justification you get from your color experiences will be undermined. You’ll still 
have justification to believe the wall is red. But your actual doubt will rationally 
obstruct you from relying on your color experiences. It’ll prevent you from 
rationally accepting that justification. (…). Unjustified beliefs and doubts may 
have no undermining effect on what propositions you have justification to 
believe; but for your beliefs to be well-founded, it’s not enough that they be 
beliefs in propositions you have justification to believe. They also have to be 
based on that justification, and they have to be rational beliefs. Suppose you 
believe P, on the basis of what are in fact good reasons for believing P. But you 
also have doubts that rationally oppose P, or rationally obstruct you from 
believing P for the reasons you do. Those doubts will render your belief in P 
irrational even if they don’t affect your justification to believe it. And if your 
belief in P is irrational, then it can’t be a justified or well-founded belief.14 
Pryor claims in this quote that, in order for an epistemic agent to obtain a 
doxastically justified or warranted belief in p, the agent needs (i) to satisfy some 
                                                                
14 Pryor, “When Warrant,” 365. 
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basing requirement and (ii) believing p needs to be rational from the perspective 
of the agent.15 To apply these requirements to the Moorean argument, if an agent 
indeed believes that she is deceived by an evil demon (with or without warrant) 
and goes on to believe (2) and then infers the conclusion of the Moorean 
argument, she fails to satisfy condition (ii), since the belief in the skeptical 
possibility obstructs her from taking her perceptual experience as evidence for 
beliefs about the external world. So, in this kind of case, the epistemic agent will 
not end up with doxastically warranted beliefs in (2) or (3). However, Pryor urges 
that this does not imply that there is anything wrong with the Moorean argument 
itself. Moreover, though Pryor does not state this explicitly in the quote above, his 
position might be understood as such that if the agent did not have the beliefs that 
she in fact has when she is rationally obstructed in believing p, she might be in a 
position to obtain a doxastically warranted belief in the conclusion of the Moorean 
argument if she were to competently perform the deduction.16 I will now make 
the case that this is exactly the sense in which the Moorean reasoning is not 
invalidated by the considerations that Leite presents.  
As shown in the presentation of Leite’s criticism of the Moorean reasoning, 
Leite thinks that when an epistemic agent engages in this reasoning, the agent 
seems to explicitly consider a skeptical possibility that is a disenabling condition 
in order for (1) to confer warrant on (2). Like I mentioned above, explicitly 
considering a skeptical possibility presumably amounts to adopting an occurrent 
attitude toward this possibility like believing that obtains or treating as an 
open question) and acknowledging that would disenable a particular warranting 
state W to confer warrant on a given belief in p. Since the agent lacks any 
doxastically warranted beliefs that does not obtain, in case she starts to reason 
according to the Moorean argument, Leite urges that the agent fails to satisfy the 
conditions laid down in principle (DR) and thus behaves in an epistemically 
irresponsible way. But does Leite’s verdict equally apply when an epistemic agent 
does not consider this possibility explicitly (i.e., when the agent does not adopt 
any occurrent attitude toward ?In cases like these, the agent should not be 
considered as behaving in an epistemically irresponsible way in light of Leite’s 
principle (DR). Let’s consider one such case.  
 
                                                                
15 I assume that condition (ii) is just a requirement that is constitutive for having a justified 
belief that p. 
16 For a defense of the claim that the Moorean argument is suitable for gaining doxastic 
justification or warrant to believe its conclusion see Tim Willenken, “Moorean Responses to 
Skepticism: A Defense,” Philosophical Studies 154 (2011): 1–25. 
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(Nigel No Disenabling) Nigel has (1) the perceptual experience of there being a 
hand in front of him, and he doesn’t envisage or consider the possibility of 
whether he might be a brain-in-a-vat deceived by an evil scientist. Suppose he 
bases his belief in (2) that there is indeed a hand in front of him on this 
experience and goes on to believe that there is a hand in front of him. Now he 
reasons in the following way. ‘If it is indeed the case that I have a hand, then I 
am not a brain-in-a-vat deceived by an evil scientist. Since I have reason to 
believe that there is a hand in front of me, I also seem to have thereby reason to 
believe (3) that I am not a brain-in-a-vat deceived by an evil scientist. Thus, I 
should indeed believe that I am not a brain-in-a-vat deceived by an evil 
scientist.’ Nigel places no credence in the skeptical hypothesis when he formed 
his belief in (2) or treats it as an open question. He also has no beliefs that would 
otherwise rationally obstruct him from believing things about the external 
world. He then goes on to believe (3) based on his belief that (2) entails (3), his 
competent deduction of (3) from (2), and his recognition that (1) warrants (2).   
In (Nigel No Disenabling), Nigel does not consider the possibility that he 
might be deceived by an evil scientist when he goes on to form a belief in the 
proposition that there is a hand in front of him. In this case, the conditions that 
Leite has introduced in his principle (DR) do not need to be fulfilled, since this 
principle only applies to possibilities that the agent explicitly considers when 
forming a belief on the basis of a warranting state. As I interpret Pryor and as I 
have already insinuated above, cases like (Nigel No Disenabling) should be 
conceived of as cases in which an agent can indeed obtain a doxastically justified 
belief through a process of reasoning in accordance with the Moorean argument 
(of course, given that the scenario is as described in (Nigel No Disenabling)). So 
(Nigel No Disenabling) does not seem to be a case that should be classified as a 
case of epistemically irresponsible behavior, even in light of the conditions laid 
down in Leite’s principle (DR). Thus, Leite cannot claim that an agent who 
engages in the reasoning under the specified conditions is to be epistemically 
blamed.  
However, might Leite not object that when the agent moves from (2) to (3), 
that Nigel explicitly considers a disenabling condition for (1) to confer warrant on 
(2) and that believing (2) is retrospectively, so to speak, irresponsible in light of 
this disenabling condition?17 I don’t think that this is a plausible description of the 
case at hand because, in order to explicitly consider the possibility that he is fed 
with experiences by an evil scientist when he moves from (2) to (3), Nigel needs to 
adopt some attitude toward this possibility, i.e., place some confidence in this 
possibility or treat this possibility as an open question (and, of course, recognize 
                                                                
17 Thanks to Jim Pryor for pressing me to address this worry.  
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that it would call into question that (1) warrants (2)). But this does not seem to be 
the case when Nigel teases out what his justified beliefs entail when he moves 
from (2) to (3). When he moves from (2) to (3) in the scenario described above, he 
only ends up with an attitude toward the negation of this skeptical possibility. In 
other words, Nigel believes that he is not a brain-in-vat deceived by an evil 
scientist because of his recognition that (2) entails (3), his competent deduction of 
(3) from (2), and his recognition that he has warrant to believe (2). Thus, in light 
of principle (DR), he is not in need of having any doxastically warranted beliefs 
that the affirmation of this skeptical possibility does not obtain in order to behave 
epistemically responsibly.  
Consider now still another case in which an epistemic agent has a 
perceptual experience of a hand but merely entertains the possibility that she 
might be deceived by an evil scientist without being confident that this possibility 
might obtain or seriously treating this possibility as an open question. Again, the 
agent might obtain a doxastically warranted belief in the conclusion of the 
Moorean argument in light of Leite’s principle (DR).  
(Nigel Merely Entertaining) Nigel has (1) the perceptual experience of there 
being a hand in front of him, and he contemplates the possibility that he might 
be deceived by an evil scientist. However, he doesn’t take this possibility very 
seriously and thus places no confidence in it. Suppose he now bases his belief in 
(2) a hand being in front of him on his perceptual experience. Now he reasons in 
the following way: ‘If it is indeed the case that I have a hand, then I am not a 
brain-in-a-vat deceived by an evil scientist. I have reason to believe that there is 
a hand in front of me. Thus, I also seem to have thereby reason to believe (3) that 
I am not a brain-in-a-vat deceived by an evil scientist. Hence, there exists a 
reason why I should believe that I am not a brain-in-a-vat deceived by an evil 
scientist.’ Nigel does not have any other beliefs that would obstruct him from 
forming a belief in (3), and therefore, he goes on to believe (3).   
As with the case considered previously, in light of Leite’s principle (DR), 
(Nigel Merely Entertaining) seems to be a case in which the agent arrives in an 
epistemically satisfactory way at a warranted belief in (3). Though he entertains 
the possibility of being deceived, he does not place any confidence in it or treats it 
as an open question. Thus, he does not need to satisfy the conditions (i) and (ii) of 
Leite’s principle (DR). Moreover, he is not obstructed from his own perspective in 
gaining a warranted belief in the conclusion of the Moorean argument. So, if an 
epistemic agent reasons according to the Moorean argument under the conditions 
specified in this case, he might as well end up with a doxastically warranted belief.  
If the cases I have presented so far indicate that an agent might arrive at a 
doxastically warranted belief in the conclusion of the Moorean argument though 
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she is not to be blamed in light of Leite’s principle (DR), this seems to cast doubt 
on Leite’s diagnosis that there is something amiss with the Moorean reasoning. 
But might Leite not modify his requirement (DR) somehow to encompass the 
cases presented? First, let us assume that an agent might not only be in need of 
warranted beliefs concerning the non-obtaining of disenabling conditions that she 
explicitly considers but also of warranted beliefs that she as a fully rational person 
should explicitly consider. It should be obvious that this modification does not 
entail that the cases (Nigel No Disenabling) and (Nigel Merely Entertaining) are 
ones of epistemically irresponsible behavior. What possibilities a rational person 
should consider are foremost determined by her own perspective. But in both 
cases discussed above, the epistemic agent Nigel happens to have no attitudes that 
rationally force him, on pain of being incoherent, for example, to place some 
confidence in the brain-in-a-vat possibility. Thus, it is evident that both cases 
considered above will not be ruled out by this suggested modified version of (DR).   
A second proposal might be that in every case in which an agent engages in 
processes of conscious reasoning, the agent needs to have doxastically warranted 
beliefs to the effect that skeptical possibilities, such as the brain-in-a-vat 
hypothesis, do not obtain. If this were Leite’s modification of (DR), then both 
cases (Nigel No Disenabling) and (Nigel Merely Entertaining) might be classified 
as instances of epistemically irresponsible behavior, since the epistemic agent does 
not possess any doxastically warranted beliefs that the disenabling condition does 
not obtain. However, a principle of this sort is clearly too strong, because it seems 
to entail that one could rarely, or rather never, arrive at a doxastically warranted 
belief through a process of conscious reasoning.18 I assume that Leite wishes to 
avoid that result as well. Hence, this modification is also not available to him.  
In sum, both cases I have presented in this section seem to be apt for 
providing an epistemic agent with doxastically warranted beliefs in the conclusion 
of the Moorean argument. However, in light of Leite’s principle (DR), there is 
nothing amiss with these cases, and, hence, the agent does not engage in 
                                                                
18 Note that Leite’s principle (DR) in the modified version discussed here differs from the 
demands that conservatives such as Wright place on the antecedently warranted attitudes. 
Wright maintains that, in order to be justified via a perceptual state, an epistemic agent is in 
need of an entitlement to accept that a sceptical hypothesis does not obtain (see Wright 
“Warrant for Nothing”). An entitlement is a distinctively externalist type of positive epistemic 
status that does not require that the agent be in possession of cognitively accessible reasons. 
Furthermore, the attitude of accepting a particular proposition differs from an occurrent belief 
in that an acceptance is more akin to attitudes such as acting on the assumption that p or taking 
it for granted that p (see Wright, “Warrant for Nothing,” 170–73)). Thus, the objections 
presented here against this revised principle of Leite’s do not affect Wright’s proposal.  
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epistemically inappropriate behavior. The reason as to why these cases are not 
ruled out by Leite’s principle (DR) is that the epistemic agent doesn’t explicitly 
consider the possibility that he might be deceived by an evil demon and is thus 
not obliged, at least according to (DR), to have a doxastically warranted belief that 
this possibility does not obtain. Though I’ve briefly considered how Leite might 
revise his principle (DR), I believe I have presented a plausible argument that the 
prospects for revising (DR) to encompass the cases introduced here are dim. 
4. Warrant, Epistemic Normativity, and the Moorean Argument 
Now, I turn to another line of criticism regarding Leite’s proposal. In the first 
section of this paper, I summarized Leite’s main commitments concerning the 
notion of warrant. Recall that Leite maintains that (i) warrants are states that 
make it likely that the contents they speak in favor of do indeed obtain. A further 
property of warranting states is, according to Leite, that they are (ii) normative 
reasons to believe particular propositions. Leite takes this to mean that if an agent 
is indeed warranted in believing that p, then believing p is, from a normative 
perspective, the right thing to do for this agent. Finally, Leite acknowledges (iii) 
that our experiences do provide us with immediate warrant to believe propositions 
about the external world. Thus, it is in a normative sense correct for an agent to go 
on to believe what her perceptual warrants tell her to believe, if she is indeed 
immediately warranted.  
But how do these commitments of Leite’s relate to the Moorean argument 
and the reasoning that seems to be licensed by the argument? On closer 
inspection, it becomes evident that Leite’s view of warranting states has, from 
Leite’s own point of view, some unwelcome consequences with respect to the 
Moorean argument. If we grant that an agent has immediate warrant to believe a 
particular proposition p, if the agent has the perceptual experience that p is the 
case, then believing p is normatively the right thing to do (if the experience of p is 
indeed a warranting state). Moreover, given that a particular warranting state 
makes it, according to Leite, indeed likely that the propositional contents they 
warrant are true, this seems to entail that skeptical hypotheses, like the brain-in-
a-vat hypothesis, are very likely false. Now, if we further assume that warrant is 
closed under known entailment and that the normative properties of a particular 
warranting state transmit to the entailments of the warranted propositions as well, 
it seems to follow that it is, from a normative perspective, appropriate for the 
Epistemic Responsibilism and Moorean Dogmatism 
305 
agent to place some confidence in (3), viz. the proposition that the brain-in-a-vat 
hypothesis is false.19  
So far, the characteristics of warranting states that Leite has introduced 
actually seem to entail that it would be normatively correct to believe (3), if an 
agent is immediately warranted in believing (2). Moreover, Leite’s commitments 
concerning the properties of warranting states even appear to entail that the agent 
is entitled to regard disenabling conditions such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis 
as misleading. If perceptual warrants are indeed reliable, the likelihood that a 
disenabling condition such as the negation of (3) really obtains seems pretty low. 
But recall that Leite urges that if the agent were to engage in a process of 
conscious reasoning, believing (3) is epistemically irresponsible in light of 
principle (DR). Now, this overall verdict concerning the Moorean argument 
appears puzzling. How can it be that believing (3) is, on the one hand, 
epistemically irresponsible – if an agent reasons according to the Moorean 
argument – when it is, on the other hand, normatively correct to believe (3), given 
that one is immediately warranted in believing (2) and that an agent is even 
entitled to treat a disenabling condition such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis as 
misleading? (Notice that Leite seems to conceive of the reasoning associated with 
the Moorean argument as being in principle inapt to gain a warranted belief in its 
conclusion.) Thus, there seems to exist a tension between the commitments of 
Leite’s concerning the nature of warranting states and his explicit verdict that the 
Moorean reasoning is defective.  
But what are we to make of this tension? The cases I have introduced in the 
previous section might provide a hint as to what kind of overall position 
concerning Moorean-style reasoning Leite should adopt given his commitments 
concerning the properties of warranting states. However, this position seems to be 
one that dogmatists such as Pryor have recommended all along. Recall that the 
cases I have introduced are cases in which the epistemic agent is rationally 
unobstructed in engaging in the Moorean reasoning and is, thus, able to end up 
with a doxastically warranted belief in the conclusion of the Moorean argument. 
If we consider the cases I have introduced in light of what Leite says about the 
properties of warranting states, it is apparent that Leite’s claim that it is 
normatively correct to believe (2) and (3) if one is immediately warranted in 
believing (2) is in line with the view that an agent might acquire a warranted 
belief in the conclusion of the Moorean argument. Given that an agent is 
warranted in believing (2) and that he is rationally unobstructed in placing some 
                                                                
19 Note that Leite does not assume that the Moorean argument suffers from transmission failure 
or that warrant is not closed under known entailment. 
Martin Grajner 
306 
confidence in (2), engaging in the Moorean reasoning and placing some 
confidence in (3) is what the agent is required to do, given the normative 
properties of warranting states. Moreover, because Leite’s commitments 
concerning the properties of warranting states further entail that disenabling 
conditions like the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis very likely do not obtain, the agent 
even seems to be entitled to treat this possibility as misleading. Hence, in cases 
such as those outlined above, believing (3) is the right thing to do for the agent, 
given that she is immediately warranted.  
However, in case the agent is rationally obstructed in believing (2), such as 
when she explicitly considers a disenabling condition for (1) to warrant (2) and 
places some confidence in this disenabling condition, engaging in the Moorean 
reasoning is epistemically irresponsible, and the agent is thus not able to acquire a 
doxastically warranted belief in the conclusion of the Moorean argument. Thus, if 
we assume that there exist these two ways an agent might be situated vis-à-vis 
disenabling conditions such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, it is evident that the 
tension between Leite’s commitments concerning the notion of warrant and his 
official verdict with respect to the Moorean argument dissolves. Reasoning 
according to the Moorean argument is apt for gaining a doxastically warranted 
belief in its conclusion, as Leite’s commitments concerning the notion of warrant 
seem to entail, only in case the agent is not rationally obstructed in placing any 
confidence in the contents of the premises of the Moorean argument. By contrast, 
if an agent is rationally obstructed in placing any confidence in (2) or (3), for 
example, reasoning according to the Moorean argument is not a way to gain a 
doxastically warranted belief in (3). In this case, it would be irrational from the 
perspective of the agent to place any confidence in the conclusion. So I am 
tempted to think that Leite’s own commitments concerning the notion of warrant 
actually reinforce the claim that there should exist ways an agent might end up 
with a doxastically warranted belief in the conclusion of the Moorean argument. I 
take this to be further evidence supporting the claim that the Moorean reasoning 
is apt for gaining doxastically warranted beliefs in propositions concerning the 
negation of skeptical possibilities. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have presented two objections to Leite’s claim that reasoning 
according to the Moorean argument is epistemically unsatisfactory. First, I have 
showed that cases of Moorean reasoning exist that do not satisfy the conditions 
laid down in Leite’s principle (DR) and should thus not be considered instances of 
epistemically inappropriate behaviour. Second, I have teased out a tension 
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between Leite’s commitments concerning the property of warranting states and 
his claim that Moorean reasoning is defective. I believe Leite has not made the 
case that Moorean reasoning is epistemically defective in a sense that threatens the 
dogmatist.20 
 
                                                                
20 The paper was written during my stay as an academic visitor at NYU’s Department of 
Philosophy in the academic year 2013/14. I would like to thank Jim Pryor for very helpful 
feedback on a previous draft of this paper. Research for this paper was supported by the German 
Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). I would like to thank the DAAD for their very generous 
support. 
